India: caught in the crossfire

Punjab - Sikh The 'Troubles' in Punjab - Caught in the Crossfire - Shown on BBC 2 UK in 1991 an examination of the Killings and 'Troubles' in Punjab, includes interviews with KPS Gill, Simranjit S Mann and Patwant Singh Khushwant Singh and the Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan. A November 2002 report prepared by the International Crisis Group stated that "security personnel regularly set up roadblocks, search private and public vehicles, detain pedestrians and check identities" (IGC 21 Nov. 2002, 13). The report additionally noted that "cordoning operations, in which a locality is sealed off and all males are paraded before masked informants while houses are searched and identities checked, are used by the military to arrest militants" (ibid.).

Describing Srinagar as "a city under siege in a brutal war zone," an August 2002 article stated that "there are military checkpoints everywhere and fortified guard posts on most intersections" in the city (World Press Review Aug. 2002). The article further noted that the city is patrolled at all hours by armoured vehicles (ibid.). A June 1999 article similarly described the situation in Srinagar, further stated that most people tend to stay in their homes at night in order to avoid "security forces who sometimes demand bribes at their roadblocks" (Time Asia 28 June 1999).

As a reaction to the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, additional security forces were reported to have been deployed at "multiple checkpoints" along the Punjab-Jammu and Kashmir border (The Asian Age 14 Dec. 2001). Additionally, state and central intelligence agencies had also begun to monitor the winter migration of people from the Kashmir Valley to the plains of Punjab (ibid.). According to the article, it was feared that "armed terrorists, including pro-Taleban elements on the run from Afghanistan, could try to slip into north India under the guise of migrating Kashmiri tribesmen" (ibid.).

Despite the continuation of a six-month unilateral ceasefire, a May 2001 article stated that residents of Kashmir's border areas in Uri township were still not allowed free movement, with those traveling along the Uri-Lalpur road having to undergo security checks at "various points" (The Tribune 19 May 2001). A local police official was reported to have stated that there still remained the possibility of militant activity and that security checks were still necessary in the border area (ibid.).

A December 2000 article reported that, while a unilateral cease-fire had not led to many changes in Srinagar, it had made a difference for many villagers in the Kashmir valley where security forces had discontinued "crackdown operations," and "road-side identification parades" (The Indian Express 21 Dec. 2000). A senior clerk of the finance department described the process that had to be followed before the cease-fire in order to travel in to Srinagar: "'at lease half an hour would be wasted in frisking and identification checks. Then the security forces would order us to disembark from the buses and make us walk for at least 100 meters near their camps'" (ibid.).

The cease-fire had reportedly even resulted in changes in the Kupwara district, which, encompassing nearly two-thirds of the Line of Control, was described as the "gateway" to Kashmir for "infiltrating militants" (ibid.). According to the article, while the security personnel are still present, checks were no longer taking place (ibid.). Before the cease-fire, reportedly, checkpoints in the district were so numerous that a 30-kilometre distance could not be travelled within a day (ibid.). For example, a resident of Dudwan village, describing the trip to Diwar village, stated that the bus would cross five "major checkpoints," at each of which travelers had to prove their identity, be frisked and open their luggage for inspection (ibid.).

Various articles describe the establishment of checkpoints and cordons as a reaction to militant activity (BBC 14 July 2002; AFP 20 Apr. 2002; Sunday Telegraph 31 Mar. 2002; The Financial Times 18 Jan. 2002). For example, a 14 July 2002 article reported that police had set up checkpoints and barricaded roads in the vicinity of a shanty town outside of Jammu (BBC 14 July 2002). The town, which is mainly inhabited by Hindus, had been attacked by suspected "Islamic militants" (ibid.). An April 2002 article reported that, while troops were reported to have "lifted mobile check-points on most of the roads," they were still laying cordons and stopping traffic for searches when the police had "specific information" (AFP 20 Apr. 2002).

Anticipating militant activity in reaction to India's Independence Day on 15 August, an August 2002 article reported that "watertight security was being ensured by hundreds of troops through cordon and search operations across Kashmir" (INQ7.net 14 Aug. 2002). The article goes on to report that additional mobile checkpoints had been set up in Srinagar, vehicles were being checked and people frisked for weapons (ibid.).

Amarnath Pilgrims arriving in the town of Pahalgam, which is 100 kilometres south-east of Srinagar, were reportedly subject to intensive security checks on the road outside of the town (The Tribune 20 July 2000). According to a July 2000 article, all vehicle passengers, pilgrims or locals were frisked, with the men directed to the left side of the road and the women entering a shed to be checked by female police officers (ibid.). A July 2002 article reporting on the same pilgrimage, stated that an estimated 15,000 policemen, paramilitary and army soldiers had been deployed to guard the Amarnath-Pahalgam route (Daily News 24 July 2002). According to the article, security personnel had been instructed to frisk "even the ash-smeared Hindu holymen at checkpoints" (ibid.).

No information on whether it is the army or the police who carry out the interrogation of suspected militants could be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate. However, section 6 of the Armed Forces (Jammu & Kashmir) Special Power Act, 1990, which is still in effect (ICG 21 Nov. 2002, 14), states that any person arrested or taken into custody under the Act is to be handed over to the "officer-in-charge of the nearest police station with the least possible delay" (India 1990). For the full text of this section, please refer to the electronic attachment.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.